

Ex. 1329

Document No. 1559A

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FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET

1 What is the prospect of the European War?

(Foreign Office)

Great probability of a prolonged war.

It appears that the German Army has already approached to the vicinity of Moscow and with the success of the present German operations it appears that most of the Soviet Forces in European Russia will be destroyed. However, we can not expect the immediate collapse of the Stalin administration. With defeats in war, it appears that the unrest of the Soviet people is gradually growing, but in view of the fact that the Russo-German war is showing the appearance of a race war, we can not think that the Soviet people's spirit to resist Germany will rapidly wane in the future. We believe that the Stalin regime, while gradually drawing back to the east, will make its utmost effort, during severe winter, to consolidate its preparation for next spring, relying on the resources east of the Volga and on the materials supplied by Britain and America. It is believed that the Russian passive resistance will continue hereafter.

As the German authorities have often confidentially informed us, the German forces are expected to secure the line linking through Leningrad, Moscow, Kharkov and Rastov, leave a number of units, and withdraw the greater part of the Army and Air forces. The attack on the Caucasus is expected to continue, but it is believed that, aside from North Caucasus, the attack on South Caucasus will be extremely difficult unless it is made through the Black Sea.

Britain is unable to conceal her confusion at the sight of the Russian forces in danger of collapse by Germany's violent attack. Though Britain is encouraging the Stalin regime together with America by supplying materials, it is doubtful to what extent the British and American aid to Russia will be effective.

The rumor circulating in one part that Germany and Russia may suspend hostilities is not without possibility, but it seems hardly possible that the Stalin administration, which has withdrawn to the east and which is in such a condition to be able to look forward to a recovery, will conclude a humiliating peace treaty with Germany. Nor can we think that Germany will take such a step in view of its policy to overthrow Bolshevism.

Since the Russo-German War broke out Britain has had four months of rest and has increased her power and confidence to defend her homeland. After the completion of a phase of the Soviet war, Germany will probably begin to attack the Near East.

Anticipating German invasion of that area, Britain is reinforcing her troops in the area linking Iran, Iraq and Syria in the Near East, and also busy in winning Turkey to her side. On the other hand, as the supremacy of the Mediterranean Sea is still in the hands of Britain, the German and Italian expeditionary forces in North Africa, with their supply routes threatened, appear to be in a difficult situation.

After the outbreak of the Russo-German War, some parts of the German occupied areas (Norway, France, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Croatia, etc.) and the Czechoslovakia Protectorate have seen uprisings such as sabotage by the Communist underground, but as they have been suppressed by her severe oppressive measures, excellent police power, and clever administration of the occupied areas, etc., it appears they will not interfere with Germany's prosecution of the war.

In short, Germany will probably attain her objective of annihilating the Russian field-army in European Russia, but it appears that Russia will hereafter retreat to the east of the Volga to continue her passive resistance. After attacking the Near East, Germany may attempt to break through the British anti-German encirclement formed through Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt and North Africa; but landing operations on the British homeland may be postponed until next spring. On the other hand, in view of the fact that America will gradually prepare herself to join the war and that while British fighting spirit remains high, it will be difficult to defeat Britain quickly. Germany, however, seems determined to completely defeat Britain, and in spite of the repeated rumor of the expected peace between Germany and Britain, there is yet no tendency for such a move, and for the time being the European War does not appear to come to an end.

3. Supposing war breaks out in the South this autumn, what a relative phenomenon will ensue in the North? (Foreign Ministry)

1. Great probability of hastening war between Japan and Russia.

The Red Army in European Russia suffered a crushing blow because of the Russo-German War, and the Russian munition industry has been left but 25 per cent because of the loss of the area west of the Volga. Since this spring the Far East Red Army has sent as reinforcements far more than two hundred thousand soldiers, 750 tanks and 1000 planes to European Russia. Though the strength has increased by mobilization, the present Far East Red Army which has increased by 23 per cent in personnel is less 37 per cent in the number of tanks, and 36 per cent in planes as compared with the strength they had in March of this year. Therefore, they are no longer able to attack Manchuria. In case Japan commences her southward advance the Russo-British military alliance will be extended to the Far East, and also a close cooperation will be made between America and Russia. Britain



and America may instigate Russia to take the offensive against Japan. But as long as the Kwantung Army is in full force Russia will never dare to invade but will only try to check us by such stratagems as destructive efforts and ideological propaganda. Of course, there is the probability that America might occupy almost forcefully some part of Russian territory in the Far East as a northern stronghold to attack Japan.

So we cannot say there is no danger of war between Japan and Russia ensuing from such a thing, and again we can not say there is no possibility that the Soviet Far East Army might cooperate with America to attack us if the American offensive against Japan from the north should be found powerful. Especially, we can expect the reconstruction of the Stalin regime with a center in Siberia in the considerably near future. So if our attack on the south will be protracted, we must take into consideration the possibility that the Far East Red Army might gradually assume an offensive attitude.

In the Russo-Japanese negotiations after the outbreak of the Russo-German War, the Russian Government made clear the following items:

1. The Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact shall be respected;
2. No military alliance against Japan shall be concluded;
3. No military bases shall be allowed to third powers in the Far East, and so on.

But these must be regarded as a Russian diplomatic policy to meet the situation after the outbreak of the Russo-German war, and in case Japan advances to the south the situation will undergo a remarkable change. Then we can not but think that in such a case Russia will take such diplomatic measures as respondent to the forecast pointed out before.

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7. In case of outbreak of war against Britain, America and the Netherlands, how much cooperation can we make Germany and Italy promise?

a. It is impossible to expect a great deal.

a. In case war breaks out this autumn:

Germany has hitherto given us the impression that she would attack America in case a war breaks out between Japan and America. In view of the obligations arising from the Tripartite Treaty, we can expect Germany and Italy to begin war against America depending on our attitude. But in this case, German (and Italian) declaration of war against America would only mean that they would take further steps in their present relations against

America. Their attack upon American vessels and warships in the Atlantic would be intensified, and they would play an effective role by diversing America in their landing operations on the British mainland, which would help us indirectly.

But it is difficult to expect all these from Germany (or Italy) which might require a preparatory period for the next operations after she comes to a pause in attacking Russia. Furthermore, now that the contact /T.N. with Germany/ through the Siberian Railway has been cut off, it is impossible to expect materials and economic assistance from Germany.

As for the case of our advance to the Dutch East Indies, Germany has contemplated pressing the Dutch people in Holland to bring pressure upon the Dutch East Indies, but we doubt its effect at present since a considerable number of German prisoners still remain in the Dutch East Indies.

b. In case war breaks out next spring:

The German forces are hinting to carry out landing operations on the British mainland next spring and the preparations on the French coast seem to be considerably advanced, but we cannot affirm that the operations will be carried out. The attack on the British mainland will indirectly help Japan to fight against Britain and America, but no more direct assistance can be expected except the operations of the Japanese and German forces which will indirectly benefit each other, since the hope of our contact /T.N. with Germany/ through Siberia will be difficult even next spring. As we are not sure whether the landing operations on the British mainland will take place next spring, it is dangerous to rely upon it.

In both cases of (a) and (b) the greatest help that we can expect from Germany and Italy will be the advance of the German and Italian forces to the Near East, Central Asia and India. In this connection, as our advance must be carried out in accordance with them, a full arrangement is required beforehand.

c. In case war breaks out later than next spring:

When Germany has consolidated her occupied areas and established a new order in Europe, her attack upon Britain will be much more intensified. And consequently it may bring considerably advantageous effect upon us to fight America, but we must take into consideration the possibility of peace between Germany and Britain.

8. Can our opponents in war be restricted to the Netherlands or both to Britain and the Netherlands?

A. No possibility of restricting them only to the Netherlands or to Britain and the Netherlands. As for the attitude to be taken by Britain



and America provided that Japan advances by force to the South, namely Thailand, Burma, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, we have certainly not yet heard of any military alliance nor any settlement concerning co-operation among Britain, America and the Netherlands (or the Chungking regime). But it is almost of no doubt that they have mutual understanding concerning this joint defense in case Japan carries out an armed advance to any one of these countries. The attitude of Britain and America will also be affected to a great degree by the time and manner of our military advance to the south, the international situation at the time, and the internal situation of both Britain and America. It is necessary to take into consideration all probable cases which may take place in this connection, but at any rate we cannot restrict our opponents only to the Netherlands or to Britain and the Netherlands in case of our southward advance, and we must also be ready for Russia's entering the war.

Now we have made the following general forecast concerning each country, judging from the present situation.

1. Britain (including Australia, Canada, etc.). When we advance to the Dutch East Indies we might expect Britain to carry out, first of all, a diplomatic campaign regarding us and the Dutch Indies, but we can expect that she probably will make up her mind to take up arms for her self-defense. (Whether she will take up arms immediately or not will depend on the situation thereof.) Judging from Britain's reports and behavior until the present, we are considerably sure of this view.

2. America. In a case as pointed out above, Britain may at once ask for American assistance. Therefore, even if America does not participate in the war immediately, she will of course acceleratedly strengthen her military preparations. Then we can suppose that in such a situation she will take the following steps:

- a. Diversionary measures against us by way of diplomacy.
- b. Close her consulates.
- c. Recall ambassadors.
- d. Severance of her diplomatic relations
- e. Demonstrations by her navy and air forces.

But it is dangerous to form such a view that America would take gradual steps toward us, judging from her attitude towards Germany. For we cannot but expect America to take much more prompt steps in case we advance to the south, compared with the case when Germany swept over the European countries. America would presumably be unable to overlook the Japanese southward advance as "another's business" because of the following reasons:

- a. In a sense she considers the southwestern Pacific area as within the zone over which she has the power of utterance (as seen in the Japanese-American negotiations.)
- b. Some materials of the above mentioned area are necessary in America (gum, tin, etc.)
- c. She fears lest she should entirely lose her right of utterance in Chinese problems.
- d. She is afraid of our occupation of the Philippines.
- e. The American public opinion would be more excited than in the case of the European War.

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9. Advantages and disadvantages of our foreign relations in case war breaks out about March of next year:

a. Advantages

1. As a result of the Russo-German War, the Soviet forces in European Russia may suffer a crushing blow and be very busy with reconstruction from this winter until next spring. Consequently a considerable transfer of the strength of the Soviet Far Eastern Army and an increasing unrest within the country are anticipated. Therefore, we think that for us the threat and burden in the north will be less than at present.

2. Depending on the situation there may also be some slight chance of taking diplomatic measures regarding Russia so as to mediate Russo-German peace.

3. As German winter operations are expected to be directed toward Africa, the Near East, and Central Asia, Britain must exert herself to defend these areas. With the preparations to meet German landing operations on the British homeland, etc., the European theatre will become busy; consequently her position in East Asia will be weakened and Germany's diversionary role will be more effective than at present.

4. Even if America does not participate in the war by next March, her preparations for entering the war will be further advanced; consequently internally she will be increasingly troubled by difficult problems of domestic administration and finance; militarily there is a possibility that she will have to divide her strength in the Pacific; while diplomatically there is the possibility that she will have to soften her attitude toward us.

5. We shall get time to improve and strengthen our diplomatic position in the Thailand and French Indo-China areas.



b. Disadvantages

1. We think that our economic difficulties will rather increase by March of next year.

2. Militarily there may be danger in also giving the opponents time for preparation.

CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1559A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief, Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 20 pages, described as follows: Questions concerning the Foreign Policy of Japan (or What Is the Prospect of the European War). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
6th day of Nov., 1946.

(s) K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: (s) Kagicharm Odo

Chief, Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry Shimojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
6th day of Nov., 1946

(s) Henry Shimojima  
NAME

Witness: (s) Eric W. Fleisher, 2nd Lt.

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

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外機密

(歐洲戰局、見透如何)  
長期戦、公算大ナリ

(外務省)

獨軍ハ既ニモスコ「周邊ニ迫リタル模様ナルカ今次獨作  
戦、成功ヨリ改露、蘇軍主力大部分ハ潰滅スヘキ處「ス  
「リニ「改權、崩壊ハ未タ俄ニ期待シ得ス敗戦ト失ニ漸次  
蘇民ハ不安高マリ「ナルヤ「モ獨蘇戦ハ民族戦、様相ヲ  
呈シ「ナル事「實ニ體ミル時蘇民族ハ抗獨意識ハ將來共急  
速ニ衰「ルモ「ト考ヘラリス「改權ハ逐次東ニ退キ「殘存セル  
「ガ「以東、資源ト英米ヨリ、物資ニ頼リ「嚴冬、間米春、準  
備ヲ整フルニ「喜ニ「スルモ「ト推測ヤ「ト蘇併、消極的抵抗、今  
復テ持續セラルル事ト觀察セラル  
獨逸首腦部、我方ニ屢次内話セルヤ「本作戦終了後獨軍  
ハ「シ「グ「ラ「ド「モスコ「バ「リ「コ「フ「ロ「スト「フ、線ヲ確保シ若干  
ノ部隊ヲ殘置シ「テ陸火ニ軍「大部ハ之ヲ引揚グルコトナル  
ヘ「ク「コーカサス、攻略ハ引續キ行ハルルモ「ト推測セラルルモ  
北「コーカサスハ別トシ南「コーカサス、攻略ハ黑海ヲ通  
スルニ非サルハ至難ナリト信セラル  
英ハ期待セル蘇軍、抵抗獨軍、猛襲ニ潰、エントスルニ當  
テ狼狽、色散「ヘカラス米ト失ニ物資提供ヲ以テ「改權、鼓  
舞シ「フ「ナルモ英米、對蘇援助カ那邊迄効果アルヤ疑問ナリ  
尙一部ニ「停ヘラルル獨蘇休戦モ可能性無キニ非レト「改權カ  
東方ニ退避ニ或ル程度、再起「期シ得ル状況ニ於テ獨  
屈伏的構和ヲナスモ「ト考ヘラリス又獨側モ「ホルニ「エ「グ

ス。打倒、見地ヨリ斯カル要ニホテサレ入ニ。

英ハ獨蘇戰爭勃發以來四月、休養ヲ得英本土防衛  
力ト其自信ヲ増大シタリ獨ハ對ソ、戰、一敗落後、近東攻略  
開始スヘク英モ亦獨、同方面進ムヲ豫想シ「イラン」「イラク」「シリア」  
ヲ連スル近東方面、兵力ヲ増強スルニ共ニ土、抱込ニ枉伸ニ居ルカ  
地方地中海、制海權、今尚英、手中ニアリテ獨伊北阿遠征  
軍、其、補給路ヲ脅カサシ困難ナル狀態ニアルモ、加ニ。

獨蘇戰爭勃發後獨占領地、一部（諾威、佛「コーゴ」勃牙  
利「クロチア」等）及「ニコ」保護領ニ共產黨、暗躍人氏、  
「サブリニ」等、為騷擾起リタルモ獨遠征軍嚴キ強圧手  
段ニ優劣ニ懸念力及巧妙ナル占領地ニ行政ヲ爲ス大體  
抑圧ヤリ居リ獨、戰爭遂行上、何事トハカスルト認  
ラレ

要之獨ハ改路ニ於ル蘇聯野戰軍戰威、目的ヲ達スヘキモ  
今後蘇聯ハ「カールガ」以東ニ退テ消極的抵抗ヲ續クモ  
ト見テ獨ハ近東攻略ヲ進メ「イラン」「イラク」「シリア」埃及及北  
阿ヲ通ズル英、對獨已圍陣ヲ突破スニ試ムヘキモ英  
本土ニ陸作戦ハ未ダ立テ持越サルヘク一ナホ、各戰態  
勢ハ漸次強化サルヘク英、抗戰意識、旺盛ト相俟ツ  
ニ急遽ニ英ヲ屈服セシムルコト困難ナルヘク然モ獨ハ銳  
ニ英、完全屈服ヲ期シ「トルキ」ニ認メテ獨英和平説ヲ  
相變ラス放送セリルモ其、氣運未ダ動スル改組戰爭  
當今終息、見込ナシト觀測セラレル。



三、今秋南方二対南戦スルモノニ北方ニ如何ナル南進的現象生ズヤ不審道  
 日蘇開戦後進歩可能性大ナリ  
 改シ赤軍ハ獨リ戦ニ依リテ殲滅的打撃ヲ被リシ、聯軍需  
 工業ハヤウガ以西ノ地ニ失コトニ在リテニ創ニ命ヲ残スニ過キサル  
 コトナリ、極東赤軍ハ應援ノ爲今春末ニ千数萬ノ兵力、戦車  
 七百五十台、飛行機一千機ヲ改シ、方面ニ送り、序々有様ニシテ  
 動員ニ依ル増強ハ、トモ現存極東赤軍、本年三月ニ比シ兵力  
 ニ割ニ令増、戦車ニ割ニ令減、飛行機ニ割ニ令減ナルヲ以テ  
 最早滿洲ニ對スル攻撃的実力ヲ有ス、序々日本カ南方進ムヲ  
 開始スル場合ニ至リ、軍事同盟カ極東ニモ擴張セラル、米、ソ  
 向ニ緊密ナル提携ヲ見リ、可ク英米ハソノ聯ニ對シテ對日攻勢ヲ使派  
 スベキ、而東軍ハ嚴格スル限リ、ソノ聯ヲ進攻ヲ敢テミズルコトセカレハ、  
 又滿洲支那ニ於テ破壊的ニ作思、望、灣、寧等ニ謀略ヲ行ヒテ、我ヲ牽  
 制セトスルニシ、米ハ又米國北方ヨリ、對日攻撃隊ヲ下シ、極東ニ領、一  
 部ヲ殆ト強制的ニ占據スルコトモアリ、斯等々原因トナリ、日ソ戦  
 開始ニ當リ、カニル危険ナシトセズ、又米國北方ヨリ、對日攻勢強カニル場合  
 極東ニ軍力ヲ協同ニ進攻シ、米ト可能性絶無ト云ヒ難ク、殊ニソノ  
 ヲ根據トスルモノ、改稱、再東攻、相當ニ行ハルコト豫想セラルヲ以  
 テ、秋、南方攻略カ長期戦ニ陥ル場合、極東赤軍カ漸次攻撃的進軍勢  
 ニ轉ジ、米ハ又可能性モ考慮スル要ナリ、獨リ、開戦後、日ソ、交渉ニ於  
 テソノ聯政府ハ日ソ中立條約ヲ遵守スベシ、且日本ヲ對照トスル軍事同盟  
 ヲ結ベサルベシ、極東ニ於テ第三國ニ軍事基地ヲ與フル如キコトセカレハ、何等  
 ノ意向ヲ明ニスルカ、右ノ獨リ戦ニ對シテ、ソノ聯ノ外交方針ト見ハル、可ク日本カ  
 南方進ムニシテ、場合ニ依リテ、態度ニ變ジ、米ハソノ以テ、其場合、ソノ聯トシ  
 テハ、前亦見、應、應、ル、中、外交、情、形、ヲ、採、リ、米、ハ、ソ、ト、見、サ、ル、可、カ、ラ、ス。

1559A

對英米蘭開戰之獨伊二如何之程度、協力之約諾之得ルヤ

多クヲ期待ス能ハス

(イ) 今秋中ニ戰爭ヲ勃發シ場合

從來獨逸側ハ日米戰爭起ル場合ニ英國ト開戦スベキ義務ナシ  
如キ印象ヲ我方ニ與ヘ居リ三國條約ノ關係ニテ我方ノ出方如何  
ニ依リテハ獨伊ノ對米開戦ハ期待シ得ベキ狀況ニ在リ但シ此場合  
獨(伊)ノ對米開戦ハ米獨ノ現在ノ關係ヲ一步進ムルニ過キス  
大東洋上ノ米船ノ米糧攻撃等ハ活發化スベク右カ米國ニ對スル章  
制的役割ヲ演ズル效果ハ二倍又英本土ニ陸作戦ノ間接的援助  
ヲ齎スベキニ對シ露戰ニ段々活ヲ付ケ定期作戦ノ準備期間ヲ  
必要トスベキ獨(伊)ニ對シテハ期待スルハ困難ナリ且西比利亞鐵道  
ニ依ル聯絡ヲ斷タレタル會獨側ヨリ物質的經濟的援助期待得  
尙其ノ他我方ノ獨印進出ノ場合獨側ヨリ獨本國民ヲ擧ノニケ獨印  
ニ壓迫ヲ加フカモ獨側ニ於テ考慮セラルトアルニ未タ獨印ニ相當  
數ノ獨人捕虜殘留シ居ル今日實情發見シ

(ロ) 來春戰爭勃發シ場合

獨軍ハ明年春ニ英本土ニ陸作戦ヲ敢行スルカ、如ク示唆居  
リ佛國海岸等ニ於ケル準備ハ相當進捗シ居ル模様ナルニ必  
ズ決行スルト斷言得ス右英本國以發見(日本)對英米戰ニ對シ間  
接的援助トナルベキニ斯ク、如キ日獨兩軍ノ作戦自體カ相互ニ  
間接的援助ノ役割ヲ演ズル以外ニ、明春三三ニ西比利亞聯絡、  
望ハ懸ニ難キヲ以テ直接の援助ハ期待得ス且獨軍ノ英本  
土ニ陸作戦カ明春實行セラルベキヤ否ヤ不明ナルヲ以テ右ニ期待ヲ懸  
クルハ危險ナリ

(イ) 及如何シ、場合ニ於テモ獨伊側ヨリ期待シ得ベキ最大援助ノ獨  
伊軍ノ近東、中央亞細亞及印度方面ニ對スル進出ナルベキ處ニ在リ

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No. 5-

(我方、進出と相呼應せしむる必要と事前ニ充分、連絡ヲ要ス)

(ハ) 戦争勃発シ來春以降トナリ場合

獨逸が占領地ヲ整理備へ政訓、新秩序ヲ建設シタル上、其、對英  
攻重ハ一層熾烈トナルヘク其結果幾分對米戦争ニ有利ナル影響有ル  
ヘキモ同時ニ英獨和平ノ可能性ヲモ考慮シ置カサルヘカラス

(イ) 戦争相手ヲ蘭ノミ又英蘭ノミニ限定シ得ルヤ

蘭又英蘭ノミニ限定シ得ル可能性無シ

帝國ヲ武力的ニ南方即チ泰、コビル、新嘉坡、蘭印等ニ進出スル  
コトアルヘキ場合英米側、採ルヘキ態度ニ関シハ、今日迄、トコロ英米、  
蘭、(又ハ重慶政權)等、間ニ既ニ軍事同盟乃至共同動作ニ関  
スル取極成立ノ確報ナキモ結局我方カ此等諸國中何レカ、一國ニ對シ  
武力的進出ヲ爲ス場合ニ於ケル其國防衛ニ付テ了解アルコト疑  
ニテキ所ナリ、而シテ英米側、採ルヘキ態度ニ付テモ我方カ武力的  
南方進出ヲ爲スヘキ時期及方法、其、當時ニ於ケル國際情勢ノ及、  
英米兩國、國內事情等ニ支配セラルル莫クアルヘク此等、點ニ関シ  
凡有場合豫想スル必要アリモ結局ニ於テハ我方、南方進出ニ  
関シ戦争相手ヲ蘭又英蘭ノミニ限定スルコトハ到底不可能ナル  
ヘク、延テハ「ソ」聯ノ参加ヲモ望見悟セサルヘカラサル次第ナリト  
思考ス、而シテ今一應現存ノ事態ヲ基礎トシテ極々一般的ニ  
個々ノ國ニ對スル判斷ヲトスルナリ如シ

一英國(濠洲、加奈陀等ヲ含ム)

我方カ蘭印ニ進出スル場合英國ハ一應外交手段ニ依リ我方  
及蘭印ニ工作ヲ試ムルカ如キコトモ豫想セラルサルニ非ルモ寧ニ直  
ニ自衛ノ爲我方武力的ニ對抗スル決意ヲ爲スニ至ルヘシ(直  
ニ武力的行動ニ出スルヤ否ヤ所ノ情勢ニ依ルヘシ)

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此、點、從來、英國側言動、鑑、略、確實ト見サルヘカラヌ

## 二、米國

右、如き場合英國、直ニ米國、援助ヲ求ムヘク、彼、米國、即時  
於戰ヲ屬スニトシ、場合ニ加連産的ニ軍事的措置ヲ強化ス  
コトハ勿論ナリ、即チ其場合ハ、

一、外交的手段ニ依ル我方牽制

二、領事館ノ閉鎖

三、大使ノ召還

四、外交關係斷絶

五、海空軍ニ依ル示威

等ノ段階ヲ經ルモノト相想像セラルモ米國ノ今日迄、獨能  
度ヲ見テ我方ニ對シテモ同様ニ漸進的ナルベシト結論スル危險ナリ  
即チ我方ノ南進ニ對應スル米國、態度ハ獨逸カ歐洲諸國ニ  
席捲セシ場合ニ採ル態度ニ比シテ著シク温和トナルベキヲ豫想  
スサルヘカラヌ蓋シ米國ハ

(イ) 南西太平洋ヲ以テ或意圖ニ於テ自國ノ發言權國內ナリト意圖  
スルコト(日米交渉ニ現ハル)

(ロ) 同方面ヨリ、物資(「ゴム」・銅等)ヲ必要トスルコト

(ハ) 支那問題ニ對シ米國ノ發言權ヲ全面的ニ失フニ至ルベキコト

(ニ) 「フィリッピン」ノ占領ヲ恐レルコト

(ホ) 歐洲戰、場合ニ比シテ輿論ノ刺激大ナルベキコト

等ノ事情アルヲ以テ日本ノ南進ヲ「他人ノコト」トシテ

默過シ得サルヲ以テナリ



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九戰年發起明年三月頃上の場合、對外國係利害

(一) 利益

(1) 獨一戰ノ結果敗北ノ弊、職滅の打撃ヲ蒙リ、今迄ヨリ明春ヨリ再建ニ赴ケルヘリ、從テ極東ノ戰軍ノ勢力移動モ相當程度豫想セラレ、是國内ノ動搖モ益々増大スヘキヲ以テ、我方ニテ北方於ケル脅威乃チ甚大ニ擔ハレ、今日ヨリモ減少スモノト認ム

(2) 情勢ノ如何ニ依リテハ、一戰獨知平ノ斡旋ヲ為ス等、聯ヲ中心トシ、外交措置直ニ講シ得ル機會モ絶無ニテラレハシ

(3) 獨軍ノ在米作戰ハ、アフリカ、近東、中亞方面ヲ目標トスルモノト豫期セラレ、他英國、同方面防戦ニ努メサルヘカラス、又獨軍、英本土上陸作戰ニ備ス等、歐洲方面益々多ク、トナリ從テ東亞、於此地位ハ自然弱トラレ、獨軍ノ牽制の役割ハ現在ヨリハ効果的ナルヘシ

(4) 米國カ明年三月迄ニ參戰セサル場合ニ參戰態勢ハ更ニ前進ス、フトトルヘリ、從テ國內の若ハ内政上經濟上、難問題輩出シ、他方軍事上のニ太平洋ニ於ケル勢力ヲ分割セサルヘカサル、フトトル可能性アルノミナラス、外交的ニ我方ニ對シ能ク度々緩和セサルヲ得サルニ至ル可能性アリ

(二) 損失

(1) 明年三月迄ノ間ニ我方ノ經濟的困難ハ寧ろ口増大スモノト認ム

(2) 軍事上のニ對テ、國ニモ準備期間ヲ與フルノ悞アリ

外機密

No. 7.

典據及公函函件證明

余、林設庵、余が下記を遺稿於て、即ち外務省文書課長トシテ日本政府  
トとの關係ニ花モノナリト、亞該官吏トシテ余が茲ニ添附セラレタ、千頁  
ヨリ成ル、千九百一一年ノ昭和一年ノ一附、下記題名、即ち歐  
洲戰局自述如何(外務省)外別紙通、文書、保管ニ付テ居ルコトヲ  
茲ニ證明ス。

余更添附記錄及文書が日本政府、公文書として、並に下記各館、省、又部局、公式書類、送致、一部として、證明書、送致する書類等、又引用、其、他公式書類、又、綴り、た、談、文、書、正、規、所、在、公、式、名、稱、ヲ、モ、特、記、ス、

三、外務省

千九百零六年/昭和十一年/十一月八日

書不來 = 張子厚品

官吏器名圖

右者，公的資格

1

林 馨 (林)

外務省之書課長

虎丘春 (虎)

式件二國元證明

原、HENRY SHIMOJIMA、余が聯合國最高指揮官總司令部に内務  
大臣として、並上記題名及び書、余が公務上日本政府に上記署名官吏  
として署名したるモノナルコトヲ數々證明す。

一九四一年/昭和十六年/十一月六日

第一 第二

"分" 分

雜記

知、知、公、公、公

證

Henry Shinjima

國障檢察部兼査官

Eric W. Fleisher  
2d

2d Lt.



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- 一、歐洲戰局見透如何
- 三、今秋南方三對之南戰在毛卜北方如何其國際的現象主  
在平（外務省）
- 七、對米蘭兩戰國之犯伊如何其程度、協力、約諾等事得  
以
- 八、戰爭相爭、蘭、又、英蘭、三限定之得也
- 九、戰爭發起、明年三月頃七場合、對外關係、利害  
(了)